Better never to have been? / Beter om nooit te gewees het nie?

(Rol af vir Afrikaans)

DIE theodicy problem - How can the evil in the world be reconciled with the existence of a good and omnipotent God? - often boils down, in the final analysis, to whether such a God would have created the universe at all. This is because theodicies often boil down to what Leibniz (who coined the word "theodicy" in the first place) had to offer on this score: God, being perfectly good, necessarily always chooses the very best; and being almighty, is always able to realise what he chooses. Therefore, we can be sure that the actual world is also "the best of all possible worlds".

The Leibnizian position is logically quite closely related to the Augustinian free will defence: God chose to create free agents because only they can enter into a personal relationship with God and thus enjoy ultimate happiness. This decision necessarily entails the possibility of wrong choices being freely made, which possibility was in fact realised in human history. (As far as non-moral evil is concerned, it is often argued, for instance by C.S. Lewis, that freedom can only be effectively exercised in a relatively predictable world, and that this very predictability or regularity - the "laws of nature" - combined with free will, is what makes non-moral evil [accidents, disease etc.] possible or even unavoidable.)

Given that, according to traditional Christian doctrine, God is omniscient, one has to assume that God knew from the start that humans would exercise their freedom badly and that this would result in all the evil and suffering witnessed through the ages. (Alternatively, God must at least have known that this possibility was real, and what the chance of its realisation was.) This immediately raises the question as to whether a good God, knowing all this, would have proceeded with creating the universe.

One possible reply to this question is that offered by Lewis (which echoes Leibniz): God surely knows better; who are we to argue?

A more sophisticated reply comes from Vincent Brümmer, who shows that one's answer to the question as to whether a good God would have created the universe knowing how much evil and suffering would result, depends on one's own value system - more specifically, on just how important or valuable freedom and personhood is thought to be. Are these things so valuable that the price of possible evil and suffering is worth paying for it?

Being a theist entails putting a high value on freedom and personhood - so high that God can be seen to have been justified in creating the kind of world we live in, a world that makes freedom and personhood possible but is also, for that very reason, open to the risk of untold evil and suffering.

For Brümmer, this is where the argument ends, but I think it can be taken further. Recently, David Benatar published a book entitled Better Never to have Been. In it, he argues on utilitarian grounds that, on the whole, it would have been better if no sentient life had ever come into existence. I have heard many philosophers chuckle when discussing this book; very few really take it seriously. (For one thing, it seems to me that if the central thesis of the book were accepted, it would count as an act of utmost virtue and heroism to destroy the whole world in an instant, say with a nuclear weapon.) Yet very few of the chucklers seem to realise that Benatar's position is logically entailed by, or even identical with, the view that a good God would not have created the universe had he known how much pain and suffering it would lead to.

- Gerrit Brand

Afrikaans:

DIE teodisee-vraagstuk - Hoe kan die kwaad in die wêreld met die bestaan van 'n goeie, almagtige God versoen word? - kom dikwels in die laaste instanse neer op die vraag of so 'n God hoegenaamd die heelal sou skep. Dit is omdat teodiseë dikwels neerkom op wat Leibniz (wat in die eerste plek met die woord "teodisee" vorendag gekom het) op dié terrein te biede had: God, synde volmaak goed, kies noodwendig altyd die heel beste; en synde almagtig, kan altyd realiseer wat hy kies. Daarom kan ons seker wees dat die bestaande wêreld ook "die beste van alle moontlike wêrelde" is.

Leibniz se posisie is logies nou verwant aan Augustinus se vryewil-argument: God het gekies om vry agente te skep omdat net hulle 'n persoonlike verhouding met God kan aangaan en sodoende ultieme geluk ervaar. Dié besluit impliseer noodwendig die moontlikheid dat verkeerde keuses gemaak kan word, welke moontlikheid dan ook in die mens se geskiedenis verwerklik is. (Wat nie-morele kwaad betref, word dikwels geredeneer, byvoorbeeld deur C.S. Lewis, dat vryheid slegs doeltreffend uitgeleef kan word in 'n relatief voorspelbare wêreld, en dat dit hierdie einste voorspelbaarheid of reëlmaat - die "natuurwette" - saam met vrye wil is wat nie-morele kwaad [ongelukke, siektes ens.] moontlik of selfs onvermydelik maak.)

Siende, dat volgens die tradisionele Christelike leer, God alwetend is, moet 'n mens aanneem dat god van die begin af geweet het dat mense hul vryheid sou misbruik, en dat dit sou lei tot al die kwaad en lyding waarvan die eeue getuie is. (Alternatiewelik sou God in ieder geweet het dat dit 'n egte moontlikheid was, en hoe groot die kans was dat dit verwerklik sou word.) Dit roep onmiddellik die vraag op of 'n goeie God wat dit alles wis, steeds sou voortgaan met die skepping van die heelal.

Een moontlike antwoord op dié vraag, is die wat Lewis bied (en wat met Leibniz resoneer): God weet sekerlik die beste; wie is ons om te stry?

'n Meer gesofistikeerde antwoord kom van Vincent Brümmer, wat wys dat 'n mens se antwoord op die vraag of 'n goeie God die heelal sou skep indien hy wis hoeveel kwaad en lyding daaruit sou voortvloei, van 'n mens se eie waardestelsel afhang - meer spesifiek, van hóé belangrik en waardevol vryheid en persoonskap geag word. Is hierdie dinge so waardevol dat dit die prys van moontlike kwaad en lyding werd is?

Om 'n teïs te wees beteken om 'n hoë waarde aan vryheid en persoonskap te heg - so hoog dat dit geregverdig kan lyk vir God om die soort wêreld waarin ons leef te geskep het, 'n wêreld wat vryheid en persoonskap moontlik maak, maar wat ook, om juis daardie rede, uitgelewer is aan die risiko van enorme kwaad en lyding.

Vir Brümmer is dit waar die argument eindig, maar ek dink dit kan verder geneem word. Onlangs het david Benatar 'n boek uitgebring met die titel Better Never to have Been. Daarin betoog hy, op utilitaristiese gronde, dat dit in die geheel beter sou wees indien geen voelende lewensvorm ooit ontstaan het nie. Ek het al baie filosowe hoor giggel wanneer hulle hierdie boek bespreek; bloedweinig van hulle neem dit ernstig op. (Om mee te begin lyk dit my dat, indien die sentrale tese van die boek aanvaar sou word, 'n mens dit as 'n daad van die hoogste deug en heldhaftigheid sou moes beskou om die hele wêreld in 'n oogwink, byvoorbeeld met 'n kernwapen, in 'n oogwink uit te wis.) Tog besef min van die giggelaars oënskynlik dat Benatar se standpunt 'n logiese gevolg is van, of selfs identiek is met, die siening dat 'n goeie God nie die heelal sou skep indien hy wis tot hoeveel kwaad en lyding dit sou ly nie.

- Gerrit Brand